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COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
STATE OF WASHINGTON
By _____

Supreme Court No. 89989-4
COA No. 31082-5-III

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

JAMES FRANCIS,

Petitioner.

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STATE OF WASHINGTON *QF*

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF SPOKANE COUNTY

The Honorable Kathleen M. O'Connor

PETITION FOR REVIEW

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

A. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER 1

B. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 1

C. ISSUES PRESENTED ON REVIEW 1

D. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1

 1. Charges and Trial. 1

 2. Closing argument. 2

E. ARGUMENT 7

 1. THE STATE’S IMPROPER COMMENTS ON MR. FRANCIS’ EXERCISE OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS CAUSED THE JURY TO REJECT HIS DEFENSE THAT HE ONLY COMMITTED THEFT, AND THE MISCONDUCT WAS NOT HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. ... 3

 a. Review is warranted. 3

 b. Constitutional misconduct. 4

 c. Appealability - objection, flagrancy and incurable. 7

 d. The violations were not justified as a “fair response.”. ... 8

 e. There was no waiver by failure to request a “curative instruction.”. 13

 f. Reversal is required. 15

 2. THE EVIDENCE OF ROBBERY WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY INSUFFICIENT 16

 a. Review is warranted. 16

 b. The evidence was insufficient. 16

E. CONCLUSION 20

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

WASHINGTON CASES

| | |
|---|---------|
| <u>State v. Austin</u> , 60 Wn.2d 227, 373 P.2d 137 (1962) | 16,18 |
| <u>State v. Berube</u> , 171 Wn. App. 103, 286 P.3d 402 (2012) | 15 |
| <u>State v. Charlton</u> , 90 Wn.2d 657, 585 P.2d 142 (1978) | 13,14 |
| <u>State v. Dennison</u> , 72 Wn.2d 842, 435 P.2d 526 (1967) | 8 |
| <u>State v. Evans</u> , 163 Wn. App. 635, 260 P.3d 934 (2011). | 6 |
| <u>State v. Easter</u> , 130 Wn.2d 228, 922 P.2d 1285 (1996) | 6,7,15 |
| <u>State v. Fricks</u> , 91 Wn.2d 391, 588 P.2d 1328 (1979) | 6 |
| <u>State v. Gregory</u> , 158 Wn.2d 759, 147 P.3d 1201 (2006). | 5 |
| <u>State v. Guloy</u> , 104 Wn.2d 412, 705 P.2d 1182 (1985) | 16 |
| <u>State v. Handburgh</u> , 119 Wn.2d 284, 830 P.2d 641 (1992) . . . | 16,17 |
| <u>State v. Lewis</u> , 130 Wn.2d 700, 927 P.2d 235 (1996) | |
| <u>State v. Netling</u> , 46 Wn. App. 461, 731 P.2d 11 (1987) | 18 |
| <u>State v. Ramirez</u> , 49 Wn. App. 332, 742 P.2d 726 (1987) . . . | 6,10,11 |
| <u>State v. Reed</u> , 102 Wn.2d 140, 684 P.2d 699 (1984). | 7,13,15 |
| <u>State v. Russell</u> , 125 Wn.2d 24, 882 P.2d 747 (1994), <u>cert. denied</u> , 514 U.S. 1129 (1995). | 7,8,11 |
| <u>State v. Salinas</u> , 119 Wn.2d 192, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992) | 17 |
| <u>State v. Sublett</u> , 156 Wn. App. 160, 231 P.3d 231 (2010), <u>affirmed</u> , 176 Wn.2d 58, 292 P.3d 715 (2012) | 13,14 |
| <u>State v. Thomas</u> , 150 Wn.2d 821, 83 P.3d 970 (2004). | 17 |

State v. Venegas, 155 Wn. App. 507, 228 P.3d 813 (2010) 14

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES

Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 108 S.Ct. 2341, 101 L.Ed.2d 184 (1988) 6

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) 16,17,20

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) 17

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS CASES

Lacy v. Nooth, 441 Fed.Appx. 472, 2011 WL 2601333 (9th Cir. 2011) 16

U.S. v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1194 (9th Cir. 2004). 6

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. Const. amend. 5 4,5,6

U.S. Const. amend. 6 5,6

U.S. Const. amend. 14 5,7,16,17,20

STATUTES AND COURT RULES

RCW 9A.56.190. 18

RAP 13.4(b) 3,4,16

TREATISES

W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law (2d. ed.1986) 18

A. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER

James Francis was the appellant in Court of Appeals case no. 31082-5-III.

B. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

Mr. Francis seeks review of the decision of January 9, 2014, affirming his two convictions for robbery. Appendix A.

C. ISSUES PRESENTED ON REVIEW

1. Did the Court of Appeals apply an erroneous standard for when misconduct should be considered invited, and in failing to consider the importance of the rights impinged upon by the prosecutor's closing argument?

2. Did the Court of Appeals incorrectly rule that the defendant waived the misconduct by not requesting a curative instruction, even where he objected and the objection was sustained?

3. Did the Court of Appeals apply an erroneous standard for waiver of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument?

4. Was there insufficient evidence of robbery?

D. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. **Charges and Trial.** Mr. James Francis was charged with two counts of robbery, one in the first degree for causing injury in the form of a scraped knee, for taking the purses of two elderly women

outside of shopping malls, in separate incidents. CP 9-10 (information); 8/7/12RP at 79-94; 8/8/12RP at 234-38. Mr. Francis testified that he simply grabbed the purses off the victims' shoulders and ran, and obtained lesser included offense instructions of theft on both counts. 8/9/12RP at 406-412, 419-24.

The co-defendant, Mr. Stefan, drove his family's car as the 'get-away' vehicle. He testified against Mr. Francis after pleading guilty to a count of robbery and a count of theft. 8/9/12RP at 335-39.

At trial, the prosecutor presented several Spokane police officers to testify about how Mr. Stefan came forward immediately and admitted what he did, and was cooperative with police questioning, and about the contrasting law enforcement efforts necessary to apprehend Mr. Francis. 8/7/12RP at 145-149. The prosecutor elicited through multiple police officers how they had to first go to Mr. Francis' residence, where they were unsuccessful in finding him; then, then ultimately located the defendant at a McDonald's restaurant, where they finally arrested him. 8/7/12RP at 168-72, 187-89, 202-03, 221-24.

2. Closing argument. In the defense closing argument, Mr. Francis argued that these incidents were thefts, not forceful robberies. 8/9/12RP at 493-97, 499-500. Defense counsel did note

that Mr. Francis had decided to not attack the co-defendant's credibility, and had determined that he would testify, and did so, admitting theft. 8/9/12RP at 500-01.

Then, in the State's rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor *faulted* Mr. Francis for not responsibly coming forward as the co-defendant Mr. Stefan did, and not talking to investigating police detectives like Stefan did, and for not responsibly agreeing to enter a plea of guilty and to provide information to the detectives -- like the Stefan did. 8/9/12RP at 506-07. Mr. Francis' counsel objected, and the trial court sustained the objection, but it continued and then the prosecutor concluded argument. 8/9/12RP at 507.

E. ARGUMENT

1. THE STATE'S IMPROPER COMMENTS ON MR. FRANCIS' EXERCISE OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS CAUSED THE JURY TO REJECT HIS DEFENSE THAT HE ONLY COMMITTED THEFT, AND THE MISCONDUCT WAS NOT HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

a. **Review is warranted.** Under RAP 13.4(b), review is warranted where a significant constitutional question is presented. RAP 13.4(b)(3). The Court of Appeals ruled that Mr. Francis invited and/or waived constitutional error and violations of Due Process in the form of prosecutorial comment on the defendant's right to silence and right to take the case to a jury trial. Decision (Appendix A); U.S.

Const. amend. 5; U.S. Const. amend. 6; U.S. Const. amend. 14.

These are constitutional questions of significance. RAP 13.4(b)(3).

b. Constitutional misconduct. As the Court of Appeals agreed, the prosecutor's comments in this case violated Mr. Francis' Due Process right to a fair trial. U.S. Const. amend. 5; U.S. Const. amend. 6; U.S. Const. amend. 14.

The prosecutor explicitly faulted Mr. Francis for failing to come forward early, and then for failing to plead guilty later, contending that all this conduct showed a lack of responsibility, and therefore required the jury to reject Mr. Francis' defense that he was now responsible only for theft:

Whether you like him, dislike him, or are completely neutral about him, the evidence in this case showed, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he committed robbery from these women. And part of being responsible is being held responsible. Not for a lesser crime, but for the crime that you actually committed.

Mr. Griffin [defense counsel] said that Mr. Stefan had little bargaining power. That's the way he described his situation. I think the reason that those words were chosen, little bargaining power, is because, frankly, the case against both these gentlemen was so strong that he didn't feel he had bargaining power to go anywhere. And indeed the case is strong.

You should find Mr. Francis guilty. You should look at the evidence in deciding whether he wants to be held responsible. Unlike Mr. Stefan, he didn't return home to talk to the police. Unlike Mr. Stefan, he didn't provide a free talk to the detectives pursuant

to an agreement to plead guilty. Unlike Mr. Stefan, he did not enter a plea and come in –

MR. GRIFFIN: Objection, your Honor.

THE COURT: Sustained.

MR. MARTIN: Unlike Mr. Stefan – and he has the right to a trial, I want to be absolutely certain about that, just like we discussed in voir dire. Regardless of the strength of the evidence, Mr. Francis has the right to a fair trial and to be convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. Mr. Stefan, however, felt that he was responsible for what happened in this case. And he felt – certainly he felt that he could get the benefit of a bargain. But you could imagine how hard it must be to get on the stand and be what people in jail might call a snitch and give testimony against your friend. It's not easy. And he had to come in here and do that.

Mr. Francis's situation was different. He didn't go home when the police were there, he was found at a McDonald's. His clothing was different. He was not rushing to accept responsibility. Now that he's accused of these crimes, he is saying he should be found responsible only of a lesser crime, not of the crime of which he's actually guilty, which is robbery in the first degree to Ms. Bird, robbery in the second degree to Ms. Altman, and I hope that you will find him guilty of both those crimes.

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.

8/9/12RP at 506-08. These twin arguments were improper.

First, it is improper for a prosecutor to make comments asking the jury to draw a negative inference from the defendant's exercise of a constitutional right. State v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759, 806, 147 P.3d 1201 (2006). Comments “naturally and necessarily” focus on the defendant's exercise of a constitutional right when they either explicitly, or implicitly, direct the jury's attention to its exercise for no

valid reason. State v. Ramirez, 49 Wn. App. 332, 336-37, 742 P.2d 726 (1987).

Here, the prosecutor's comments were explicit improper impugment of Mr. Francis's failure to plead guilty (unlike Mr. Stefan) and accept responsibility. Mr. Francis had a Sixth Amendment right to trial and the prosecutor below improperly sought guilt on the basis that he exercised that right. U.S. Const. amend. 6 (right to criminal trial); U.S. v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1194 (9th Cir. 2004).¹

Second, it was improper for the prosecutor to repeatedly fault Mr. Francis for not responsibly coming forward and talking to investigating detectives, and for not responsibly agreeing to provide information, unlike the co-defendant. 8/9/12RP at 506-07. The constitutional right to remain silent while police are investigating a crime, protected by the Fifth Amendment,² of course fully exists prior to a person's arrest. State v. Easter, 130 Wn.2d 228, 235, 922 P.2d 1285 (1996) (citing Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210-12, 108 S.Ct. 2341, 101 L.Ed.2d 184 (1988)); State v. Fricks, 91 Wn.2d 391,

¹ The prosecutor's brief remark acknowledging defendants' right to go to trial does not in any way cure this aspect of the misconduct. State v. Evans, 163 Wn. App. 635, 646, 260 P.3d 934 (2011).

² The Fifth Amendment states that no person "shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const. amend. 5.

396, 588 P.2d 1328 (1979); U.S. Const. amend. 14.³ The defendant's failure to come forward may not be used by the State as "substantive evidence of defendant's guilt." State v. Lewis, 130 Wn.2d 700, 705, 927 P.2d 235 (1996).

c. Appealability -- objection, flagrancy and incurable. Mr. Francis may appeal. Where the defendant objects to closing argument misconduct, he may appeal. State v. Reed, 102 Wn.2d 140, 145, 684 P.2d 699 (1984).

Unfortunately, the objection plainly had no effect, because the misconduct continued. Even if the defendant had not objected, he may appeal where the comments were so flagrant or ill intentioned that an instruction could not have cured the prejudice of the improper exploitation. State v. Russell, 125 Wn.2d 24, 86, 882 P.2d 747 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1129 (1995). In Mr. Francis' trial, flagrancy is demonstrated by the fact that the Washington courts' appellate decisions, including the foregoing cited cases, have long condemned the practice of seeking to hinge a defendant's guilt on his exercise of his constitutional rights. See. e.g., Easter, supra. Further, the State's improper closing arguments flagrantly capitalized on the foundation of its trial portrayal of the co-defendant in

³ The rights at issue and their violation were discussed in detail in the Appellant's Opening Brief and Reply Brief.

comparison to Mr. Francis, summing up the evidence by faulting the defendant for asserting his multiple constitutional rights instead of taking responsibility for robbery. The Court of Appeals erroneously rejected this manifest characterization of the case. Decision, at p. 12, n. 1.

d. The violations were not justified as a “fair response.”

The Court of Appeals (1) stated that the prosecutor was “**clearly responding**” to defense counsel’s arguments. Decision, at pp. 8-9 (citing State v. Russell, 125 Wn.2d 24, 86, 882 P.2d 747 (1994); and State v. Dennison, 72 Wn.2d 842, 849, 435 P.2d 526 (1967)). The Court noted this argument by defense counsel:

During voir dire you remember I asked you if you were [in] a position where you were not guilty of a crime and your attorney advised that you didn't have to testify, how many of you would want to anyway? Well, you saw. That's the approach we took. He testified. Although it was incredibly embarrassing, in front of his mother, he's subject to cross-examination, I don't think it was very pleasant. I also don't think it was an evasive strategy. He wanted to take the stand and explain what happened, what he did and what he didn't do. I think that's worthy of serious consideration.

* * *

Now the state may argue to you . . . that Mr. Stefan took responsibility, pled guilty. I think a couple of things are noteworthy about his arrangement with the state. First, he had other felony matters pending, two counts of first degree trafficking in stolen property and a residential burglary. . . . In agreement for [his plea bargain], he came in and testified as he did. And it

may have been—probably was a very smart decision. I think it's interesting that he pled guilty in count 2 to a first degree theft. So if the prosecutor argues that he took responsibility, well he pled guilty to a first degree theft. It's also interesting that he pled guilty to first theft or the incident that he witnessed. For the one that he saw, where he actually saw what happened, he pled guilty to a first degree theft. For the incident that happened behind him that he didn't see, he pled guilty to a robbery. So I ask you to please take that in consideration when deciding how much responsibility he took. He was in a very difficult position, had very little bargaining power and pled to a robbery that he didn't even see if it happened or not.

Decision, at p. 5 (quoting selections from 8/9/12RP at 500-03).

These routine defense closing statements did not authorize the prosecutor to launch into a constitutionally improper comparison of the defendant, who had not come forward or plead guilty, and urge the jury to find the greater crime of robbery because Mr. Francis had not done the responsible thing, like the co-defendant had done. Defense counsel merely commented that Stefan was not heroically responsible simply because he entered guilty pleas to the current charges. 8/9/12RP at 499-502.

Counsel also merely stated that Mr. Francis, for his part, was before the jury asking that the State prove the allegations at this trial, beyond a reasonable doubt. 8/9/12RP at 500. In addition, Mr. Francis had testified for the jury as was his right. 8/9/12RP at 500.

Finally, counsel remarked that Mr. Francis was on trial for robbery, whereas Mr. Stefan's plea was to theft. 8/9/12RP at 501-02.

Counsel then made clear to the jury that its decision and responsibility was to decide whether robbery or the lesser offense(s) of theft was committed. 8/9/12RP at 501-02. The remainder of the defense closing argument centered on factual arguments, going to the elements, on this central dispute in the criminal case. 8/9/12RP at 500-04.

The Court also failed to consider the importance of the rights impinged upon by the prosecutor's misconduct in determining whether anything defense counsel stated was a provocation of that misconduct, thus ruling in conflict with State v. Ramirez, 49 Wn. App. 332, 336-37, 742 P.2d 726 (1987) (improper comment on defendant's failure to testify was not invited by defendant's closing argument setting forth various hypothetical reasons why a defendant might not testify in his own behalf).

[D]efense counsel's comments unduly emphasized Ramirez's silence. After making a tactical decision to keep him off the stand, she then proceeded to justify his failure to testify. However, considering the seriousness of the constitutional rights at issue, we cannot say that defense counsel's remarks "invited" the deputy prosecutor's comments.

Ramirez, at 339. Ramirez stands for the proposition that even if a State's rebuttal addresses a topic or even an argument advanced by the defense in closing, that response may not be a wholesale assault on the defendant's exercise of his right to silence, or here, his right to silence and his right to demand trial, *much less* an argument by the prosecutor specifically and directly asking the jury to *rely on those exercises* to find guilt. That is what happened here.

Similarly, under the Russell case relied on by the Court, the argument by the defense in closing did not give the State carte blanche to commit misconduct in closing or to improperly comment on the defendant's exercise of his constitutional rights, and escape invalidation on appeal, under the rubric that it was a response to an argument by the defense. Remarks of a prosecutor, even if they are improper, are not grounds for reversal if they were invited or provoked by defense counsel and are in reply to his or her acts and statements, but not if the remarks are not a pertinent reply or are so prejudicial that a curative instruction would be ineffective. State v. Russell, 125 Wn.2d 24, 87, 882 P.2d 747 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1129, 115 S.Ct. 2004, 131 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1995). Defense counsel has no power to "open the door" to prosecutorial misconduct.

Finally, as laid out in the facts section of Appellant's Opening Brief and herein, any remark by defense counsel regarding the co-defendant pleading guilty and the defendant not wishing to, was prompted by the State's theme in the evidence phase contrasting the co-defendant's "responsible" act of coming forward in the investigative phase with the fact that the defendant did not do the same. As noted in the Appellant's Opening Brief, the prosecutor presented numerous police and civilian witnesses who described the co-defendant's early confession to police and his voluntary surrender as soon as he learned he was in trouble, compared to the fact that police had to locate Mr. Francis.

It was the State that introduced the suggestion of a fact pattern at trial that contrasted the defendant with the co-defendant, who plead guilty. Defense counsel's innocuous closing argument simply and wholly properly reminded the jury that Mr. Francis from the beginning believed he was not a robber and was further asserting so at trial, to this, his jury. When the State summed up with its clearly improper remarks at the very close of the case, the factual theme painted during the evidence phase was painted with this improper brush, and the entire trial rendered an indictment of Mr. Francis's failure to inculcate himself to the police and then

unreasonably putting everyone through a trial instead of pleading guilty.

e. There was no waiver by failure to request a “curative instruction.” The Court of Appeals stated that misconduct is waived unless there is a proper objection “**and a request for a curative instruction.**” Decision, at pp. 8-9 (citing State v. Sublett, 156 Wn. App. 160, 185, 231 P.3d 231 (2010), affirmed, 176 Wn.2d 58, 292 P.3d 715 (2012); and State v. Charlton, 90 Wn.2d 657, 661-64, 585 P.2d 142 (1978)).

Mr. Francis argues there was neither any waiver by a failure to request a curative instruction, although the misconduct, he argues, was in any event incurable. The State below relied on State v. Charlton and argued that Mr. Francis did not request a curative instruction. BOR, at p. 4. The Court agreed. Decision, at pp. 8-9. But the Court of Appeals in Sublett actually stated:

If the prosecuting attorney's statements were improper and the defendant made a proper objection to the statements, then we consider whether there was a substantial likelihood that the statements affected the jury's verdict. State v. Reed, [102 Wn.2d 140, 145, 684 P.2d 699 (1984)]. Absent a proper objection and a request for a curative instruction, the defense waives a prosecutorial misconduct claim unless the comment was so flagrant or ill-intentioned that an instruction could not have cured the prejudice. State v. Charlton, 90 Wn.2d 657, 661, 585 P.2d 142 (1978).

Sublett, at 185. And Charlton did not demand a curative instruction request or deem the absence of one a waiver. The Court held that improper prosecutorial comment concerning the defendant's exercise of the statutory marital privilege was mindful, flagrant, and ill-intentioned conduct, and simply held that the defendant did not waive his right to object to such conduct on appeal by failing to request a curative instruction following the comment. State v. Charlton, 90 Wn.2d 657, 661-64, 585 P.2d 142 (1978). The fact that the defense did not seek a curative instruction should not be determinative.

The Court of Appeals decision was contrary to recent decisions. Any inadequate technical preservation of any portion of the prosecutor's multi-pronged improprieties in closing should not be a basis for insulation of the State's misconduct from this Court's scrutiny on appellate review. See, e.g., State v. Evans, 163 Wn. App. 635, 647-48, 260 P.3d 934 (2011) (reversing in part because no curative instruction could have erased the panoply of violation of several constitutional rights in closing argument causing an unfair trial); State v. Venegas, 155 Wn. App. 507, 525, 228 P.3d 813 (2010) ("flagrant" misconduct where the prosecutor repeatedly attacked the defendant's existing constitutional rights with improper argument).

f. **Reversal is required.** Given the errors below, the competing factual assertions and arguments in the case, and the State's ultimately marginal proof of robbery, the State cannot prove "harmlessness" beyond a reasonable doubt. If the prosecuting attorney's statements were improper and the defendant made a proper objection to the statements, then the Court considers whether there was a substantial likelihood that the statements affected the jury's verdict. State v. Reed, *supra*, 102 Wn.2d 140, 145, 684 P.2d 699 (1984). The State must show that constitutional misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Berube, 171 Wn. App. 103, 112 and n. 30, 286 P.3d 402 (2012) (noting application of standard in cases of comment on pre-arrest silence) (citing State v. Easter, *supra*, 130 Wn.2d at 242).

Importantly, the controversy at trial below was whether robbery, or theft, was committed. In this context, the prosecutor explicitly asked the jury to make a connection between Mr. Francis' failure to come forward, plead guilty, and take "responsibility," and his necessary guilt for the **greater** charged crimes of robbery. Thus, by the deputy prosecutor's own stated terms, the misconduct was materially prejudicial, it was therefore not harmless, and reversal is required under any standard. 8/9/12RP at 507. And

further, it is beyond cavil that the evidence of robbery was not overwhelming. See also State v. Guloy, 104 Wn.2d 412, 426, 705 P.2d 1182 (1985) (untainted evidence must be overwhelming).

2. THE EVIDENCE OF ROBBERY WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY INSUFFICIENT

a. **Review is warranted.** Under RAP 13.4(b), review is warranted where a significant constitutional question is presented. RAP 13.4(b)(3). In the present case, the Court of Appeals rejected James Francis's argument that the evidence was insufficient to prove robbery. Decision, at p. 17. The sufficiency of the evidence is a constitutional question of significance in this case and Mr. Francis asks that this Court accept review. RAP 13.4(b)(3). Further, the Court of Appeals decision is in conflict with State v. Handburgh, 119 Wn.2d 284, 293, 830 P.2d 641 (1992); and State v. Austin, 60 Wn.2d 227, 232, 373 P.2d 137 (1962), *infra*. Review is warranted under RAP 13.4(b)(1).

b. **The evidence was insufficient.** A criminal conviction based on insufficient evidence contravenes the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. 14; Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Lacy v. Nooth, 441 Fed.Appx. 472, 2011 WL 2601333 (9th Cir. 2011) (NO. 10-36031) (noting sufficiency of evidence requirement to

support petitioner's state robbery conviction under Jackson v. Virginia); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) ("the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged").

Evidence is sufficient if, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it permits any rational trier of fact to find the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 319; State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992); U.S. Const. amend. 14. All reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the State and interpreted strongly against the defendant. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d at 201; State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 874, 83 P.3d 970 (2004).

A person commits robbery when he unlawfully takes personal property from the person of another or in his presence against his will "by the use or threatened use of immediate force, violence, or fear of injury to that person.

RCWA 9A.56.190. Any force or threat, however slight, which induces the owner to part with her property is sufficient to support a robbery conviction. State v. Handburgh, 119 Wn.2d 284, 293, 830 P.2d 641 (1992). However, the mere taking of an item from a person

by an act of physical conduct (as opposed to wishing or spiriting the item off the victim) is not robbery. State v. Austin, 60 Wn.2d 227, 232, 373 P.2d 137 (1962) (but finding no error in refusing instruction to this effect, where evidence did not support instruction).

Thus reversal is required in this case where the trial evidence did not prove robbery, in the form of a force used to induce the taking from the person. RCW 9A.56.190; CP 205 (jury instruction 12). State v. Austin, 60 Wn.2d at 232; see also W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law § 8.11(d) at 781 (2nd ed.1986) (the "weight of authority supports the view that there is not sufficient force to constitute robbery when a thief snatches property from the owner's grasp so suddenly that the owner cannot offer any resistance to the taking"); State v. Netling, 46 Wn. App. 461, 465, 731 P.2d 11 (1987) (property taken from pocket is not robbed by force from the person).

Here, first, Ms. Bird, whose purse was taken on March 11, stated that a man who she could not identify pulled on the strap of her purse, and then he suddenly had it in his possession. 8/7/12RP at 79-80. Ms. Bird had tried to hold onto her purse and fell and scraped her knee. 8/7/12RP at 82; 8/7/12RP at 132, 138. She stated, however, that the purse was taken off her shoulder so fast she did not even remember turning her head. 8/7/12RP at 93-94.

Second, in particular, the March 30 incident, outside of the Bed Bath and Beyond store, was described to the store manager as a “purse snatching,” 8/7/12RP at 209-10, and did not establish robbery of the victim. The surveillance video of this incident showed a person approach Ms. Altman, the shopper, and “grab her purse and run away.” 8/7/12RP at 214; Exhibit 17.

At trial, Ms. Altman testified that she was walking toward her car after shopping at the bed and bath store, when she sensed a shadow over her left shoulder. 8/8/12RP at 234, 237. Suddenly, she described, “the next thing that I saw was my purse going off the end of my arm.” 8/8/12RP at 237. Ms. Altman stated that that everything happened so fast, there was no “force applied,” and suddenly her purse was gone. 8/8/12RP at 238. Further questioning confirmed that the purse was simply taken:

Q: Did you have a sense of what was taking the purse off your shoulder?

A: No. The next sense I had was that it was gone or going.

Q: Did you do anything before your purse was actually gone?

A: No.

Q: Were you able to grab ahold of it?

A: No.

Q: Did you make any effort to stop your purse from being taken from you?

A: No. Because it takes a moment to have the sense that this is actually happening to you.

8/8/12RP at 238. On cross-examination, Ms. Altman confirmed that her purse was gone before she registered what was happening. She expressed relief that she had not had time to try and grip the purse and try to prevent its taking, since, in retrospect, she would not have wanted a struggle. 8/8/12RP at 252-53. This is not overwhelming uncontroverted proof of robbery by use of force.


Finally, the jury's inquiry during deliberations, asking the court, "What is the legal definition of force?," demonstrates that this particular jury deemed the matter at hand a close determination. In fact, the State cannot meet its burden to prove that the evidence was sufficient, and the judgments violate the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. 14; Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 316.

F. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Mr. Francis respectfully asks this Court to reverse the judgment and sentence of the Spokane County Superior Court.

Dated this 10 day of February, 2013.

Respectfully submitted,



Oliver R. Davis – WSBA 24560
Washington Appellate Project
Attorney for Appellant

APPENDIX A

FILED

January 9, 2014

**In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III**

**IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE**

| | | |
|-----------------------|---|---------------------|
| STATE OF WASHINGTON, |) | |
| |) | No. 31082-5-III |
| Respondent, |) | |
| |) | |
| v. |) | |
| |) | |
| JAMES LELAND FRANCIS, |) | |
| |) | |
| Appellant, |) | UNPUBLISHED OPINION |
| |) | |
| JARED A. STEFAN, |) | |
| |) | |
| Defendant. |) | |

SIDDOWAY, J. — James Francis appeals his convictions of first degree robbery and second degree robbery, arguing that the prosecutor, in closing argument, impermissibly commented on his exercise of his constitutional rights to a trial and to remain silent. During rebuttal argument, the prosecutor contrasted Mr. Francis’s actions following the crimes with those of his accomplice, pointing out that unlike his accomplice, Mr. Francis did not “return home to talk to the police,” did not “provide a free talk to the detectives pursuant to an agreement to plead guilty,” and did not “enter a plea.” Report of Proceedings (RP) (Aug. 9, 2012) at 507. While the trial court sustained an objection to this argument by the defense, Mr. Francis contends that the State persisted with similar

argument that was flagrant, ill-intentioned, and the prejudice from which could not be cured.

The State's argument was objectionable and the defense objection was properly sustained. The argument was raised only in rebuttal, though, and the defendant declined to request a curative instruction or object further. Because he shows no substantial prejudice from those statements that were improper, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

James Francis was charged with first and second degree robbery for two instances of purse snatching in March 2012. In both cases, Mr. Francis grabbed the purses from the victims and his accomplice, Jared Stefan, drove the getaway car.

The evidence against Mr. Francis was overwhelming. It included testimony of eyewitnesses to the purse snatchings, one of whom (a witness to the second crime) correctly noted the license plate of the car being driven by Mr. Stefan. That led police to Mr. Stefan, who admitted his role, pleaded guilty, and testified against Mr. Francis. The evidence also included videotapes of both incidents; text messages between Mr. Francis and Mr. Stefan relating to the crimes; and ultimately, Mr. Francis's own apologetic admission at trial that he committed the crimes due to an addiction to oxycontin and a desperate need for more drugs, and therefore cash, brought on by withdrawal.

At issue was only whether the State could meet its burden of proving two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: first, that Mr. Francis used force in the two crimes and was

No. 31082-5-III
State v. Francis

therefore guilty of robbery, and second, that Mr. Francis caused bodily injury to the first victim, making the crime a first degree robbery.

When the State called Mr. Stefan to testify to his and Mr. Francis's plan and commission of the crimes, he acknowledged making a plea bargain that required him to testify against Mr. Francis, whom he considered a friend. He admitted that as part of his agreement with the State, the charges against him had been reduced from first degree robbery and second degree robbery to, respectively, second degree robbery and first degree theft. He admitted that two of three other charges previously pending against him (one for residential burglary, two for trafficking in stolen property) had been reduced as part of the plea bargain as well.

Asked about events leading up to the crimes, Mr. Stefan testified that he and Mr. Francis met in an inpatient drug rehabilitation program, that both had initially tried to stay sober following their completion of the program with the support of their families, but that both returned to drug use approximately a month later and quickly returned to smoking oxycontin at a cost of about \$500 per day. He testified that he and Mr. Francis committed crimes to obtain money for drugs.

Mr. Stefan testified that he and Mr. Francis planned both purse snatchings in advance. He waited in the car on both occasions and did not see Mr. Francis snatch the purse from the first victim but did see him take the purse from the second victim. Significantly for the closing arguments that gave rise to the issue on appeal, Mr. Stefan

admitted that the purse snatching from the first victim was a robbery, testifying as follows:

Q. Now when you entered this agreement with the state for your testimony, why did you plead guilty to the offense of robbery in the first degree against Sharon Bird?

A. What do you mean? 'Cause we did it.

Q. And do you, in fact, believe that you were an accomplice to robbery in that case?

A. Yeah. Yes.

RP (Aug. 9, 2012) at 357-58.

The lawyers' closing arguments dealt predominantly with the difference between the crime of robbery and the lesser included crime of first degree theft, which Mr. Francis's lawyer urged was the crime actually committed and the proper verdict on both counts.

When Mr. Francis's lawyer gave his closing argument, he admitted that his client had committed "despicable" crimes. *Id.* at 492. But he emphasized Mr. Francis's addiction and evidence that he had grabbed the purses from the two women without threats, violence, or injury to them.

Toward the end of his argument, Mr. Francis's lawyer addressed the testimony offered against his client by Mr. Stefan. He told the jury that when he initially looked at his client's case, there were few witnesses who could identify Mr. Francis as being involved and "I think I could have taken a very different approach with [Mr. Stefan] and tried to suggest that perhaps he's willing to point the finger at anyone for a significant

reduction in his sentence. Significant reduction. But Mr. Francis didn't want to do that."

Id. at 499-500. Continuing to credit the conduct of his own client, he argued:

During voir dire you remember I asked you if you were [in] a position where you were not guilty of a crime and your attorney advised that you didn't have to testify, how many of you would want to anyway? Well, you saw. That's the approach we took. He testified. Although it was incredibly embarrassing, in front of his mother, he's subject to cross-examination. I don't think it was very pleasant. I also don't think it was an evasive strategy. He wanted to take the stand and explain what happened, what he did and what he didn't do. I think that's worthy of serious consideration.

....
Now the state may argue to you . . . that Mr. Stefan took responsibility, pled guilty. I think a couple of things are noteworthy about his arrangement with the state. First, he had other felony matters pending, two counts of first degree trafficking in stolen property and a residential burglary. . . . In agreement for [his plea bargain], he came in and testified as he did. And it may have been—probably was a very smart decision. I think it's interesting that he pled guilty in count 2 to a first degree theft. So if the prosecutor argues that he took responsibility, well he pled guilty to a first degree theft. It's also interesting that he pled guilty to first theft or the incident that he witnessed. For the one that he saw, where he actually saw what happened, he pled guilty to a first degree theft. For the incident that happened behind him that he didn't see, he pled guilty to a robbery. So I ask you to please take that in consideration when deciding how much responsibility he took. He was in a very difficult position, had very little bargaining power and pled to a robbery that he didn't even see if it happened or not.

Id. at 500-03.

When it was the prosecutor's turn for rebuttal, he addressed the defense argument contrasting Mr. Francis's decision to take the stand with Mr. Stefan's decision to make a

deal. He addressed it toward the end of his rebuttal and was interrupted by an objection that was sustained. His reply to the argument proceeded as follows:

You should look at the evidence in deciding whether [Mr. Francis] wants to be held responsible. *Unlike Mr. Stefan, he didn't return home to talk to the police. Unlike Mr. Stefan, he didn't provide a free talk to the detectives pursuant to an agreement to plead guilty. Unlike Mr. Stefan, he did not enter a plea and come in—*

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, your Honor.

THE COURT: Sustained.

[PROSECUTOR]: Unlike Mr. Stefan—and he has the right to a trial, I want to be absolutely certain about that, just like we discussed in voir dire. Regardless of the strength of the evidence, Mr. Francis has the right to a fair trial and to be convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. *Mr. Stefan, however, felt that he was responsible for what happened in this case. And he felt—certainly he felt that he could get the benefit of a bargain. But you could imagine how hard it must be to get on the stand and be what people in jail might call a snitch and give testimony against your friend. It's not easy. And he had to come in here and do that.*

Mr. Francis's situation was different. He didn't go home when the police were there, he was found at a McDonald's. His clothing was different. He was not rushing to accept responsibility. Now that he's accused of these crimes, he is saying he should be found responsible only of a lesser crime, not of the crime of which he's actually guilty, which is robbery in the first degree to Ms. Bird, robbery in the second degree to Ms. Altman, and I hope that you will find him guilty of both those crimes.

Id. at 507-08 (emphasis added).

Mr. Francis did not interpose an objection to the latter argument. He did not ask for a curative instruction.

The jury found Mr. Francis guilty as charged. He appeals.

ANALYSIS

Mr. Francis makes two, related assignments of error: he argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by improperly commenting on his pretrial silence and at the same time improperly commented on his choice not to plead guilty.

Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution, which applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and under article I, section 9 of the Washington Constitution. *State v. Easter*, 130 Wn.2d 228, 238, 922 P.2d 1285 (1996). The right to remain silent “extends to situations prior to the arrest of the accused.” *Id.* at 243. Because “[a] criminal defendant’s assertion of his constitutionally protected due process rights is not evidence of guilt,” courts have long held that the State may not “invite a jury to infer that a defendant is more likely guilty because he exercised his constitutional rights.” *State v. Silva*, 119 Wn. App. 422, 428-29, 81 P.3d 889 (2003).

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution guarantee the right to trial by an impartial jury. *State v. Gonzales*, 111 Wn. App. 276, 277, 45 P.3d 205 (2002). A defendant has a right to put the State to its burden of proof at a trial, and “the State may not draw adverse inferences from the exercise of a constitutional right.” *State v. Gregory*, 158 Wn.2d 759, 806, 147 P.3d 1201 (2006) (quoting *State v. Rupe*, 101 Wn.2d 664, 705, 683 P.2d 571 (1984)).

No. 31082-5-III
State v. Francis

“A defendant who alleges improper conduct on the part of a prosecutor must first establish the prosecutor’s improper conduct and, second, its prejudicial effect.” *State v. Dhaliwal*, 150 Wn.2d 559, 578, 79 P.3d 432 (2003) (citing *State v. Pirtle*, 127 Wn.2d 628, 672, 904 P.2d 245 (1995)). “Any allegedly improper statements should be viewed within the context of the prosecutor’s entire argument, the issues in the case, the evidence discussed in the argument, and the jury instructions.” *Id.* (citing *State v. Brown*, 132 Wn.2d 529, 561, 940 P.2d 546 (1997)). Prejudice on the part of the prosecutor is established only where there is a substantial likelihood that the instances of misconduct affected the jury’s verdict. *Id.*

Even if a prosecutor’s comments are improper, absent a proper objection and a request for a curative instruction, the defense waives a prosecutorial misconduct claim unless the comment was so flagrant or ill-intentioned that an instruction could not have cured the prejudice. *State v. Sublett*, 156 Wn. App. 160, 185, 231 P.3d 231 (2010) (citing *State v. Charlton*, 90 Wn.2d 657, 661, 585 P.2d 142 (1978)), *aff’d*, 176 Wn.2d 58, 292 P.3d 715 (2012). Remarks of a prosecutor, even if they are improper, do not warrant reversal if they were invited or provoked by defense counsel and are in reply to his statements, unless the remarks are not a pertinent reply or are so prejudicial that a curative instruction would be ineffective. *State v. Russell*, 125 Wn.2d 24, 86, 882 P.2d 747 (1994) (citing *State v. Dennison*, 72 Wn.2d 842, 849, 435 P.2d 526 (1967)).

No. 31082-5-III
State v. Francis

In making the determination whether a prosecutor has improperly commented on a defendant's right to remain silent, we consider "whether the prosecutor manifestly intended the remarks to be a comment on that right." *State v. Crane*, 116 Wn.2d 315, 331, 804 P.2d 10 (1991). "[A] prosecutor's statement will not be considered a comment on a constitutional right to remain silent if 'standing alone, [it] was so subtle and so brief that [it] did not naturally and necessarily emphasize defendant's testimonial silence.'" *State v. Burke*, 163 Wn.2d 204, 216, 181 P.3d 1 (2008) (some alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *Crane*, 116 Wn.2d at 331).

Applying these principles to the prosecutor's comments here, his initial comments, to which Mr. Francis interposed an objection, were improper. While not extensive, they were not subtle and they were not brief enough to be inconsequential. They manifestly were a comment on Mr. Francis's exercise of his rights. In the context of the argument, their only logical relevance was to criticize Mr. Francis for his pretrial silence and his choice not to plead guilty, so we regard them as intentional.

To say they were intentional in that respect is not to say that they were ill-intentioned, however, and in context, we conclude that they were not. The prosecutor did not make the argument until rebuttal. He was clearly responding to defense counsel's effort to contrast what he characterized as Mr. Francis's integrity in standing for trial to take responsibility but explain himself, with Mr. Stefan's choice to enter a plea to resolve his outstanding criminal problems.

The prosecutor's argument is somewhat like the argument at issue in *United States v. Tarallo*, 380 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2004), *amended on denial of reh'g*, 413 F.3d 928 (2005), a case cited by Mr. Francis. In that case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to reverse a conviction on the basis of a prosecutor's argument that he had called an accomplice of the defendant to testify "to give you a view to see somebody who has accepted responsibility for what he did, who has admitted to you, 'Yes, I lied. I lied. I knew these were lies, and I continued to make them.'"" *Id.* at 1194. The court in *Tarallo* concluded that when construed as an effort by the prosecutor to rehabilitate and enhance the credibility of the accomplice, the comments were not even improper. Here, too, the prosecutor's effort to rehabilitate Mr. Stefan was not improper—where he got in trouble was by following the lead of defense counsel's argument and contrasting Mr. Stefan's actions with those of Mr. Francis.

As to the prosecutor's further comments made after the objection was sustained, some, though not all, were improper. It was (again) not improper for the prosecutor to attempt to rehabilitate Mr. Stefan. And the prosecutor's argument that Mr. Francis's testimony at trial was in an effort to persuade the jury to convict him of a lesser crime, not to take responsibility, was a fair response to the defense closing argument. It is only the prosecutor's argument that Mr. Francis "didn't go home when the police were there" and "was not rushing to accept responsibility" that continued to improperly comment on Mr. Francis's exercise of his constitutional rights. These comments were not met with an

No. 31082-5-III
State v. Francis

objection, however, even though another objection presumably would have been sustained. Mr. Francis must establish that these latter statements were so flagrant and ill-intentioned that he was irreparably prejudiced.

Mr. Francis's failure to request a curative instruction and, in the case of the latter comments, even to object, is dispositive. First, the failure to make a further objection or request a curative instruction suggests that the comments did not appear unduly prejudicial to Mr. Francis's lawyer in the context of trial. *State v. Swan*, 114 Wn.2d 613, 661, 790 P.2d 610 (1990). And in *Jones v. Hogan*, 56 Wn.2d 23, 26, 351 P.2d 153 (1960), the Washington Supreme Court addressed the circumstance of one prompt objection to an improper comment that was sustained, followed by a second improper comment in response to which "[n]o more was asked. Upon the second reference, no action at all was asked of the trial court." When the defendant later complained on appeal that the prosecutor's statements "'denied defendant the right to a fair and impartial trial'" and that "'no instruction to the jury . . . could remove the irreparable damage done by [the] second unwarranted reference'" the court answered:

If misconduct occurs, the trial court must be promptly asked to correct it. Counsel may not remain silent, speculating upon a favorable verdict, and then, when it is adverse, use the claimed misconduct as a life preserver on . . . appeal.

Id. at 27. The circumstances of this case are identical. The answer is the same.

Finally, we disagree completely with Mr. Francis's contention that no curative instruction could erase the prejudice caused by those comments by the prosecutor that were improper. The State's closing arguments account for 18 pages of the verbatim report of proceedings. All of its comments complained of on appeal, not all of which were improper, account for about one page of that argument. The comments were not central to the State's case¹ but were an incompletely-thought-through effort to counter an attack on Mr. Stefan's credibility raised by the defense.

Mr. Francis waived his objection for the most part. To the limited extent that the objection was not waived, he does not demonstrate flagrant, ill-intentioned conduct whose resulting prejudice an instruction could not have cured.

STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL GROUNDS

In a pro se statement of additional grounds (SAG), Mr. Francis states four.

His first is that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to sever the two offenses under CrR 4.4(b). In denying the motion, the court explained that "the presumption in favor of joint trial was not overcome" and that the "possible prejudice to the presentation of the defense case is outweighed by the interest in judicial economy." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 161.

¹ Having reviewed the record, we disagree with Mr. Francis's suggestion that the contrast made by the prosecutor in rebuttal paralleled a theme he had been developing through trial.

No. 31082-5-III
State v. Francis

CrR 4.4(b) provides that the trial court must sever offenses if it “determines that severance will promote a fair determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence of each offense.” At the same time, “Washington law disfavors separate trials.” *State v. McDaniel*, 155 Wn. App. 829, 860, 230 P.3d 245 (2010). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating in his motion to sever that “a trial involving both counts would be so manifestly prejudicial as to outweigh the concern for judicial economy.” *State v. Bythrow*, 114 Wn.2d 713, 718, 790 P.2d 154 (1990).

Trial courts consider the following factors in determining whether the potential for prejudice requires severance: “(1) the strength of the State’s evidence on each count; (2) the clarity of defenses as to each count; (3) court instructions to the jury to consider each count separately; and (4) the admissibility of evidence of the other charges even if not joined for trial.” *Russell*, 125 Wn.2d at 63. A trial court’s refusal to sever offenses is reviewed for manifest abuse of discretion. *Bythrow*, 114 Wn.2d at 717.

As to the first factor, the strength of the State’s evidence for the two counts was similar, as Mr. Francis’s lawyer conceded in arguing the motion. RP (Aug. 2, 2012) at 18. There was substantial evidence that Mr. Francis committed both crimes. From Mr. Francis’s perspective, there was similar evidence that he had not used force or threats in either. The only difference was that the first victim fell and was injured.

As to the second factor, Mr. Francis argues that the court ignored his different defenses to the two charges, but at the time he argued the motion to sever, he was unsure

whether he would even assert different defenses. “A defendant’s desire to testify only on one count requires severance only if a defendant makes a ‘convincing showing that [he] has important testimony to give concerning one count and a strong need to refrain from testifying about another.’” *Russell*, 125 Wn.2d at 65 (quoting *State v. Watkins*, 53 Wn. App. 264, 270, 766 P.2d 484 (1989)). Here, Mr. Francis offered only unexplained conjecture that he might not take the stand in defense of the first count “depending a lot on how the State’s case plays out.” RP (Aug. 2, 2012) at 21. In any event, the State responded that “a trial judge has a lot of discretion with cross examination if the defendant wants to remain silent as to one of these two counts,” conceding, “I think a trial court has the power to tell me I can’t ask about that count, and the defendant can limit his testimony to just one of the charges. The Court can, thereby, limit my cross examination to one of those charges.” *Id.* at 23.

As to the third factor, Mr. Francis conceded that it was insignificant in arguing the motion to sever, stating, “We see the Court can properly instruct the jury. There’s not an issue there.” *Id.* at 18-19.

Mr. Francis places most emphasis on the fourth factor: prejudice from evidence that he argued would not be cross admissible in separate trials. In *Bythrow*, our Supreme Court found that a court’s denial of a motion to sever two robbery offenses was proper even though the two crimes were not so similar that evidence of the first would be admissible in prosecution for the second. 114 Wn.2d at 720-21. The court reasoned that

“[w]hen evidence concerning the other crime is limited or not admissible, our primary concern is whether the jury can reasonably be expected to “compartmentalize the evidence” so that evidence of one crime does not taint the jury’s consideration of another crime,” it held that “the defendant must be able to point to specific prejudice.” *Id.* (quoting *United States v. Johnson*, 820 F.2d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 1987)). Mr. Francis points to no specific prejudice.

Mr. Francis’s second ground identified in his SAG is that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to give a curative instruction after Officer Dustin Howe, when asked about the injury suffered by the first purse snatching victim, stated, “I want to say she said something to the effect like she felt like she got hit by a truck.” RP (Aug. 7, 2012) at 163. Mr. Francis’s lawyer objected to this statement, and the court sustained the objection. Mr. Francis contends that sustaining the objection was not enough; that “[a] curative instruction is needed or prejudice must be presumed” and that the officer’s testimony was “prejudicial and inflammatory.” SAG at 11-12.

Mr. Francis cites no authority in support of the proposition that the trial court needed to do more than sustain the objection. The trial court’s concluding instructions to the jurors reminded them that “[i]f evidence was not admitted . . . , then you are not to consider it in reaching your verdict.” CP at 192. And “[a] party who fails to ask for a limiting instruction waives any argument on appeal that the trial court should have given the instruction.” *State v. Stein*, 140 Wn. App. 43, 70, 165 P.3d 16 (2007).

Mr. Francis's third ground is that the trial court abused its discretion when it "chose to ignore" an inquiry by the jury during deliberations as to the legal definition of force. SAG at 13. The trial court did not ignore the inquiry. It responded, telling the jury to "[p]lease continue deliberations. You are to consider only the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and the instructions of the court." CP at 222.

Mr. Francis suggests that the failure to define "force" denied him a fair trial, citing *State v. O'Donnell*, 142 Wn. App. 314, 174 P.3d 1205 (2007). But as *O'Donnell* points out, "whether the words used in an instruction require further definition is a matter of judgment to be exercised by the trial court"; "[i]n a criminal case . . . the trial court is required to define technical words and expressions, but not words and expressions which are of common understanding and self-explanatory"; and "[a] term is considered technical when its legal definition differs from the common understanding of the word." *Id.* at 325. *O'Donnell* held, as had earlier cases, that "theft" was a term of common understanding and self-explanatory.

"Force" is similarly a word of common understanding and self-explanatory. And the court's instructions informed the jury, consistent with RCW 9A.56.190, that the "force or fear" used in committing a robbery "must be used to obtain or retain possession of the property or to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking, in either of which case

No. 31082-5-III
State v. Francis

the degree of force is immaterial.” CP at 205 (Instruction 12). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to define the term further in response to the jury inquiry.

Mr. Francis’s fourth ground is essentially that the jury’s verdicts were not supported by substantial evidence where the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he used force.

As previously observed, the degree of force used or threatened in a robbery is immaterial. RCW 9A.56.190. “Any force or threat, no matter how slight, which induces an owner to part with his property is sufficient to sustain a robbery conviction.” *State v. Collinsworth*, 90 Wn. App. 546, 553-54, 966 P.2d 905 (1997) (quoting *State v. Ammlung*, 31 Wn. App. 696, 704, 644 P.2d 717 (1982)).

Mr. Francis emphasizes that his first victim testified that her purse was taken off her shoulder so fast she did not “even remember turning [her] head.” RP (Aug. 7, 2012) at 93. But she also testified that she “struggled” to hold onto her purse, and stated, “I feel I was pulled to the ground because I was holding on for dear life.” *Id.* at 82. A witness to the incident testified that the victim was “holding on so hard that she fell over when he pulled the purse away from her.” *Id.* at 132.

The victim of the second incident testified that, as she was leaving the store, she “sensed something” over her shoulder and the next thing she saw was her purse “going off the end of my arm.” RP (Aug. 8, 2012) at 236-37. When asked, “[D]id the purse come off your arm because of your relaxation? Or was there some other force applied to

No. 31082-5-III
State v. Francis

it?" she answered, "No, it was on my shoulder." *Id.* at 238. Mr. Francis also testified that he ran toward the second victim and used two hands to grab her purse. RP (Aug. 9, 2012) at 420-23. While he said that he grabbed the purse from the side "so it would be quick and easy and I didn't have to hurt anybody," *id.* at 422, injury is not required to establish a robbery. Mr. Francis admitted that it required some level of force to remove the purse from her hand. While another jury might have reached a different verdict, the evidence presented was sufficient to support this jury's verdicts.


Affirmed.

A majority of the panel has determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.



Siddoway, J.

WE CONCUR:



Korsmo, C.J.



Kulik, J.

**IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE**

| | | |
|----------------------|---|-----------------|
| STATE OF WASHINGTON, |) | |
| |) | |
| RESPONDENT, |) | |
| |) | |
| v. |) | NO. 31082-5-III |
| |) | |
| JAMES FRANCIS, |) | |
| |) | |
| APPELLANT. |) | |

DECLARATION OF DOCUMENT FILING AND SERVICE

I, NINA ARRANZA RILEY, STATE THAT ON THE 10TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2014, I CAUSED THE ORIGINAL **PETITION FOR REVIEW** TO BE FILED IN THE **COURT OF APPEALS** AND A TRUE COPY OF THE SAME TO BE SERVED ON THE FOLLOWING IN THE MANNER INDICATED BELOW:

MARK LINDSEY
SPOKANE COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
1100 W. MALLON AVENUE
SPOKANE, WA 99260

U.S. MAIL
 HAND DELIVERY

FILED
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF WASHINGTON
FEB 10 PM 1:47

SIGNED IN SEATTLE, WASHINGTON THIS 10TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2014.

x 

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